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KENTucy LAW JoURNAL
POSSIBILITY OF REVERTER AND THE RULE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES IN KENTUCKY
The traditional distinction between a possibility of reverter and a
right of entry for condition broken is that a "possibility of reverter
arises when the preceding determinable fee expires by the terms of
its own limitations, whereas the right of entry cuts short a fee simple
which would otherwise continue indefinitely".1 According to the
Restatement of Property, a right of entry (therein referred to as a
power of termination) comes after a condition subsequent;- a pos-
sibility of reverter after a condition precedent.3 It is often stated that
the latter arises when such words as "so long as," "during," and "until"
are used, and the former when, "but if," "provided that," and "on con-
dition" are used.- The theory seems to be that the first are words of
limitation and thus point to a determinable fee and the latter, being
words of condition, point to a right of entry. However, courts have
recognized that these definitions are not too useful in the solving of
an actual case,5 and after an exhaustive study Professor Dunham0
stated:
[W]e must inform our students that outside the class room ... it is
impossible to determine before litigation whether any given phrasing
of a conveyance will be interpreted as a special limitation or as a
condition subsequent.7
He also concluded that there is no substantial difference in terms of
legal consequences between the two interests.8
The Kentucky Court of Appeals apparently recognizes no distinc-
tion between a possibility of reverter and a right of entry and uses
only the label "possibility of reverter," without attempting to determine
whether under traditional theory the appropriate words were used.
However, even though the court uses the label "possibility of re-
verter," it treats it theoretically as a right of entry would be treated
under orthodox doctrine. 9 It is the purpose of this note to examine
I Church in Brattle Square v. Grant, 3 Gray 142 (Mass. 1855); Casner and
Leach, Cases On Property 351 (1st ed. 1951).
2 Restatement, Property, Sec. 155 (1936).
3 Id. at See. 154.
4 Simes and Smith, Law of Future Interests 843, 344 (2d ed. 1956).
6 Stevens v. Galveston Railway, 212 S.W. 639 (Tex. 1919).
6 Dunham, Possibility of Reverter and Powers of Termination-Frateral or
Identical Twins?, 20 Chi. L. Rev. 215 (1958).
7 Id. at 216.
8 See also 43 Ky. L.J. 285 (1955) and cases cited and discussed therein. This
note criticized the court for not distinguishing between the two interests. Cf.
Leach, Cases on Future Interests 21 (4th ed. 1956).
9 Hoskins v. Walker, 255 S.W. 480 (Ky. 1953). While calling the interest
reserved a possibility of reverter, the court stated that
"On the other hand, a breach of a condition subsequent may result in
the forfeiture of the estate. . . . Some positive act of the grantor or
his heirs-such as a re-entry claiming forfeiture-is necessary.
[Vol. 46,
the application of the rule against perpetuities to the possibility of
reverter as it is known in Kentucky. Recent decisions of the court
have created doubt as to the scope and meaning of Kentucky's statute
against perpetuities, especially in its application to the possibility of
reverter.
The rule against perpetuities had its inception in the old English
common law and is in force in this country as a common law rule
except where it-has been superseded by statute. In Kentucky, a
statute relating to perpetuities was first enacted in 1852,10 and is now
section 381.220 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes. It provides as
follows:
The absolute power of alienation shall not be suspended, by any
limitation or condition whatever, for a longer period than during the
contnuance of a life or lives in being at the creation of the estate,
and twenty-one years and ten months thereafter.
This statute differs in wording from the classic statement of the com-
mon law rule by Gray: 1 "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at
all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the
creation of the interest." The Kentucky statute prohibits the suspen-
sion of the power of alienation, if taken by its plain wording and
meaning, while Gray's rule prohibits the remote vesting of interests.
The rules are entirely different and should not be confused. The rule
against perpetuities is concerned with the remote vesting of interests
and not with the suspension of the power of alienation of property
through the creation of interests in unborn and unascertained persons.
Unlike the rule against suspension the rule against perpetuities is not
satisfied by the fact that there are persons in being who can join to-
gether and convey a fee simple title to a purchaser.' 2 It is more in-
elusive than the rule against suspension of the power of alienation; if
a devise violates the rule against suspension it will inevitably violate
the rule against remoteness,a but the converse is not true.14 An in-
10Roberts, Kentucky's Statute Against Perpetuities, 16 Ky. L.J. 297 (1928).
This note also discusses the general problem of whether the statute is one dealing
with suspension or restraints on alienation or if it is merely a codification of the
common law rule against perpetuities.
11 Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities 191 (4th ed. 1942).
12 America, it is almost universally held that the rule against petpetuities
does not apply to possibilities of reverter, whereas an executory interest has long
been held subject to the rule and void if it is possible that it will not vest within
the permissible period. See Morris and Leach, The Rule Against Perpetuities
(1956).
13 The power of alienation can be suspended only when unborn or unas-
certained persons have an interest in the property, and an interest in unborn or
unascertained persons is necessarily contingent.
14 For example, a devise "to A and his heirs so long as the premises are used
for a schoolhouse, then to B and his heirs" violates the latter but not the former.
B's executory interest may not vest in possession for centuries; but A and B can
at any time join together and convey a fee simple absolute.
1957] NOTES
KENTucKY LAW JouRNAL
terest void under the rule against perpetuities may be, and usually is,
alienable at all times. The court in construing the Kentucky statute
stated that this statute was merely a codification of the common law
rule against perpetuities. 15 Subsequent cases have created some doubt
as to whether the rule against suspension of the power of alienation
or the rule against remoteness of vesting (or both) is in force in Ken-
tucky. The Kentucky statute at one time or another has been in-
terpreted as a prohibition of (a) remoteness of vesting; (b) suspension
of the power of alienation; and (c) unreasonable restraints on aliena-
tion. In Cammack v. Allen,16 the issue before the court was whether
the statute prohibited restraint on alienation. The grantor by deed
conveyed a remainder after a life estate to X, until (1) she die
without descendants, (2) she attempt to sell her interest or (3) she
lease the land for a period of more than two years, in which case a
forfeiture would result in favor of X's brothers and sisters. The court
held that X had a defeasible fee encumbered with conditions sub-
sequent and further stated that the attempt to restrain alienation for
the grantee's lifetime was unreasonable, and therefore void. It was
argued that the statute by implication permitted the "suspension" of
alienation for a period of lives in being plus twenty-one years. The
court held that the statute was inapplicable and in the course of its
opinion made the following comments as to the scope and application
of the statute:1
7
It has been a statute of this state for a long number of years, and
has always been treated and referred to in the opinions of this court
as Kentucky's Statutes against perpetuities. ... [A]ll... opinions...
on the power to restrain alienation were rendered . . . from the
standpoint of the common-law rule upon the subject. ... In none
of the opinions was the statute referred to as creating a rule with
reference to the imposition of such restraints. . . . The statute,
therefore, has in effect been construed to apply only to cases and
situations where the suspension of alienation was due to the postpone-
ment of the vesting of a fee in a person who could alienate it. If
such postponement is beyond the life or lives of persons in being
and 21 years and 10 months after the creation of the estate, it comes
within, not only the common law rule against perpetuities, but
violates the quoted section of our statute which was but declaratory
of the common-law rule and was intended only as a statute against
perpetuities, and not one dealing with the right of alienation by a
person in whom the fee vested within the permissible period pre-
scribed by it.
15 Coleman v. Coleman, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1476, 65 S.W. 832 (1901); Cam-
mack v. Allen, 199 Ky. 268, 250 S.W. 963 (1923); Fidelity and Columbia Trust
Company v. Tiffany, 202 Ky. 618, 260 S.W. 857 (1924).
16 Ibid.
17Cammack v. Allen, Id. at 272, 250 S.W. at 964-965.
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If the court had adhered to its position that the statute was "but
declaratory of the common law rule against perpetuities," much con-
fusion would have been avoided in later cases.
The court has from time to time applied this statute as if it dealt
with suspension of the power of alienation and unreasonable restraints
as well as with the remote vesting of estates. In Ernst v. Shinkle,18 a
provision in the testators will "... . that it shall not be lawful to sell
any of my real estate", was declared void as against the "Statute
against Perpetuities." 9 In this case the restraint had no time limit and
both the rule against unreasonable restraints upon alienation and the
rule against suspension of the power of alienation (but not the com-
mon law Rule against Perpetuities) could be said to have been vio-
lated. The court, however, seemed to lose sight of the distinction be-
tween "restraining" alienation and "suspending" the power of aliena-
tion as well as the fact that it had previously said the statute embodied
the common law Rule against Perpetuities.
The absolute power of alienation is suspended when there are no
ascertainable persons in being who can join and convey a fee simple.20
On the other hand, the rule against restraints is a rule against express
prohibition of alienation (e.g., "B shall not convey his interest" "the
interest of B is not assignable"); the effect of the rule is to invalidate
the restraint, leaving the property freely alienable in the hands of the
transferee. Of course a direct restraint of the disabling type as in the
above example would suspend the power of alienation for the dura-
tion of the restraint, since this type removes the power to alienate.
Both rules are thus violated. The confused language in the Kentucky
cases might possibly result from the fact that Kentucky has long upheld
reasonable restraints on alienation.21 This has the effect of leaving the
property in the hands of the transferee subject to the restraint, i.e., he,
like a minor or a person non compos mentis, cannot legally transfer it.
Another case in which the court used confused language in dis-
cussing restraints was in Kentland Coal and Coke Company v. Keen.22
A conveyance provided that "said George Keen [grantee] is not to sell
this land in my [grantor's] lifetime." In construing this clause the
court stated: 23
1895 Ky. 608, 26 S.W. 813 (1894).
1) Id. at 609, 26 S.W. at 813.2oChaplin, Suspension of the Power of Alienation, 3 (3rd ed. 1928).21 Frazier v. Combs, 140 Ky. 77, 73 S.W. 812 (1910); Anderson v. Simpson,
214 Ky. 325, 283 S.W. 941 (1926). These cases lay down a general rule that a
reasonable restraint is for the life of the devisee or grantee only.
22 168 Ky. 836, 183 S.W. 247 (1916).
23 Id. at 838, 183 S.W. at 248.
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That this clause creates what is known in the law of real estate con-
veyances as a condition subsequent there can be no doubt. This is
so manifest as to be at once accepted without citation of authorities.
The court held that this condition was reasonable and a forfeiture
implied.24 Since the life tenant's conveyance was merely voidable,
and the action was not brought in time, he could convey a good title.
If this case represents Kentucky's position and a forfeiture is implied
whenever a restraint is put on alienation of property, then the court
is creating rights of entry or possibilities of reverter, and treating
restraint cases as if they had express reverter clauses. However, in
spite of the language, it is believed that this case does not represent
the present rule and Professor Roberts,25 after studying the cases, con-
cludes that a provision for termination is always required in Kentucky.
A fairly recent case, Gray v. Gray,26 tends to support Roberts' position.
In any event a "reasonable restraint" under Kentucky law could never
last beyond one life in being and the Rule against Perpetuities should
never be involved where the restraint is express.
In applying the statute to possibilities of reverter and executory
interests the court has also termed the statute alternatively as a pro-
hibition of remoteness of vesting, suspension of alienation and un-
reasonable restraints on alienation. Executory interests have been
called possibilities of reverter and upheld under Kentucky's statute.
In Patterson v. Patterson,27 the grantor made a conveyance of land to
the Turnpike Company, and provided that when the land cease to be
used for collecting tolls it should revert back to A, B and C or their
heirs (grantor's brothers-in-law). This was a suit between heirs of
the grantor and the heirs of A, B and C for possession when the land
was abandoned by the grantee. The former argued that the interests
of A, B and C were void for remoteness as being a perpetuity. In dis-
posing of this contention the court stated:
28
Without entering upon a dissertation as to the meaning of the legal
term, 'perpetuity,' it is sufficient to say that the purpose of the statute
is not to compel the vesting of estates, but to prohibit unreasonable
restraints upon alienation. (Emphasis added)
24 As indicated by its statements, the court cited no authority in support of
this language. This was probably due to the fact that no authority for this state-
ment is to he found.25 Roberts, Future Interests in Kentucky, 13 Ky. L.J. 186 (1924).
26 300 Ky. 265, 188 S.W. 2d 440 (1945). This case stated that a conveyance
by a life tenant in violation of a restraint would be only voidable (obviously
meaning he can convey in the face of the restraint) as there was not provision
for cesser or forfeiture.
27 135 Ky. 339, 122 S.W. 169 (1909).
28 Id. at 343, 122 S.W. at 170.
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The court then held that the "reversion" created in A, B and C and
their heirs did not violate the statute, as they could at any time sell
their interests under Kentucky statutes. The interests here were not
true reversions nor were they possibilities of reverter, for a reversion
or a possibility of reverter arises only in the grantor when he conveys
less than what he has. The interest in the instant case was an executory
interest created in third persons, and was clearly void under the com-
mon law Rule against Perpetuities because it might not vest within
lives in being plus twenty-one years.
Under the orthodox Rule against Perpetuities as applied in Amer-
ica, possibilities of reverter are classified as vested and are always
valid.20 In Kentucky a possibility of reverter has never been said to
vest too remotely but has been said to violate the rule against suspen-
sion of power of alienation when it has been said to be inalienable. A
possibility has been considered inalienable by the court when the per-
son who gets this interest is not definitely named in the conveyance.
In Duncan v. Webster County Board of Education,"0 there was a
conveyance of a lot in a large tract to the school district and the deed
provided that when such land should no longer be used for school
purposes it was to "revert to the tract of land, or to the person then
owning and possessing the said tract of land."3' Plaintiffs' claimed as
owners by mesne conveyances from the grantor of the larger tract
from which the school lot had been carved. The court held that it was
unnecessary to decide whether there was a reversion or possibility of
reverter since in either event the attempt to vest the reversionary right
in whoever happened to own the original tract violated the statute. It
was stated by the court:32 "... . the absolute power of alienation pos-
sibly was suspended.., longer than during the continuance of a life
or lives then in being and 21 years and 10 months. ... " The reasoning
of the court was to the effect that there was no one in being who could
release the condition attached to the land. This is believed to be fal-
lacious reasoning as there are always owners in being of the larger
tract who could release it, assuming the "interest" was assigned to them
by the conveyance. Under orthodox doctrine the interest sought to be
created was an executory interest. The court could have very well
used this classification and held the "interest" void because it would
vest too remotely. A similar case was McGaughey v. Spencer County
Board of Education,33 where the interest was to revert to the "farm"
20 Morris and Leach, supra note 12.
80 205 Ky. 86, 265 S.W. 489 (1924).
81 Id. at 87, 265 S.W. at 489.
32Id. at 88, 265 S.W. at 490.
88 285 Ky. 769, 149 S.W. 2d 519 (1941).
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from which it was taken. This interest was declared void, the court
speaking in terms of restraints on alienation. The court used the same
line of reasoning as in the Duncan case to the effect that there were
not persons in being who could release the condition. Where, how-
ever, the land is to revert back not to the farm or tract of land from
which it has been carved but to the "grantor, his heirs and assigns,' 34
the reservations are valid under the statute when sought to be en-
forced by remote heirs or assignees. Bowling v. Grace,35 is representa-
tive of this line of cases. In this case the property was to revert to
the grantor or his heirs or assigns. This possibility of reverter was
held valid, the court stating: 36
[T]he absolute power of alienation was not suspended. The pos-
sibility of reverter possessed by the grantors could have been released
at any time unto the holder of the defeasible fee ...
Thus a marked distinction appears to have been drawn between
whether the possibility of reverter is reserved in the grantor, "his heirs
and assigns," or whether reserved to the original "grant" or "farm"
from which it was conveyed, the former being valid and the latter
being considered void under the statute. The golden thread the court
has seized upon and appears to apply, is that, if it is possible at all
times that there is someone in existence who can release the reverter
there is no violation of the statute, and where the adjoining landowner
has the possibility it cannot be released. In cases where the possibility
was declared void the same result could have been reached by giving
the interest its proper classification of an executory interest and declar-
ing it void under the rule against perpetuities. It is believed that the
court has seized upon an illusory distinction in attempting to justify
its holding in the two situations. To support the reasoning in the
Duncan case where the possibility (properly an executory interest)
was to revert back to the original tract of land, and was void because
there was no one in existence to release the condition, one would have
to assume that the possibility remains in the original grantor or
testator's heirs and thus when the breach occurs, it "springs" to the
owner of the tract at that remote time. One must further assume that
no assignee down the line from the time of the creation of the con-
dition in the original conveyance to the time of its breach' has any in-
terest in it or power to release the condition. It is submitted that the
34 Murray Hospital Assn. v. Mason, 306 Ky. 248, 206 S.W. 2d 936 (1947);
Fayette County v. Morton, 282 Ky. 481, 138 S.W. 2d 953 (1940); Bowling v.
Grace, 219 Ky. 496, 293 S.W. 964 (1927).
35 Ibid.36 Bowling v. Grace, Id. at 498, 293 S.W. at 964.
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possibility and the ultimate power to release it must be in someone at
all times. Either the grantor or his heirs must have it. The only thing
one needs to know is whether the grantor is dead. If not, he can
convey it at any time. If he is dead his heirs, who are ascertained,
have inherited the possibility and can release it at any time. Moreover
the possibility of reverter is alienable both by decisions,3 7 and by
statute.38 If the grantor has conveyed the possibility, then such owner
or his heirs likewise are ascertained at all times and can release the
condition.
In several cases where the problems of suspension or restraints on
alienation were involved, and there was no question of remoteness
of vesting, i.e., prohibited sale of farm for 30 years,3 9 restraint upon
power of sale by life tenant,40 the court appeared to treat the statute
as one dealing with restraints on alienation only. In Fayette County
Board of Education v. Bryan,41 the question was whether a possibility
of reverter to the heirs of the grantor was void, and in the course of
its opinion the court stated: 42 "The purpose of the statute against
perpetuities is not to compel vesting of estates, but to prohibit un-
reasonable restraints upon alienation." In Bates v. Bates,43 the grantor
provided that when the land ceased to be used for school purposes,
the land was to revert to grantor. In 1947, 89 years later, the lot was
abandoned by the school board. However, in 1925 the grantor had
conveyed to X the original tract which included the school lot but no
mention was made of it in the deed. The heirs of the grantor alleged
that a possibility of reverter was created which descended to them.
The court in rejecting their contention stated: 44
We construe the option to have been personal to the grantor... and
have terminated with his death. But if it be regarded as unlimited
as to the individual or to the time of its exercise ... then the pro-
vision was void ab initio for it violated the rule against perpetuities
or restraint on alienation.
A possible explanation for the above holding is that the court wanted
to reach a desirable and equitable result and prevent a "windfall" to
the grantor's heirs, especially since they had joined in the 1925 con-
veyance to the defendant. An examination of the cases however, fails
37Austin v. Calvert, 262 S.W. 2d 825 (Ky. 1953).
s8Ky Rev. Stat. sec. 381.210 states, "Rights of reversion may be sold or
conveyed."89Perry v. Metcalf, 216 Ky. 755, 288 S.W. 694 (1926).
40Gray v. Gray, 300 Ky. 265, 188 S.W. 2d 440 (1945).
41263 Ky. 61, 91 S.W. 2d 990 (1936).
421d. at 63, 91 S.W. 2d at 991.
48314 Ky. 789, 236 S.W. 2d 943 (1950).
44 Id. at 790, 236 S.W. 2d at 943.
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to show any such pattern. In Patterson v. Patterson, supra, a remote
grantee was given a "windfall" whereas in the McGaughey case, supra,
the grantor's widow and numerous children (who had been living in
the abandoned schoolhouse) were put out in the cold by the holding
that the possibility of reverter reserved by the grantor was void.
In summary, the court seems to treat all interests following a
forfeiture (orthodox possibilities of reverter, rights of entry, executory
interests after a fee simple determinable or fee simple subject to a
condition subsequent) as possibilities of reverter and to violate the
rule against suspension when such interests are in persons who (ac-
cording to the court) are not ascertained. It is apparent that in every
situation where an interest is reserved and there is some type of
restraint, one must litigate the question before a determination can be
made as to whether the limitation or condition is void or valid. Just
what Kentucky's statute means, and to what interests it applies, is in
much confusion. One does not have to look far to come up with a case
to support any proposition he might wish to propound in this field. In
the recent case of Taylor v. Dooley,45 the court recognized this when,
referring to KRS 381.220, it stated:46
Since its enactment, the statute has been applied indiscriminately to
restraints on alienation of vested estates and to the remote vesting
of an estate. The failure to distinguish between the two situations
has resulted in much confusion. The power view is that the statute, as
embodying the rule against perpetuities, is concerned with the remote
vesting of estates rather than the restraints on alienation of vested
estates, despite the language of the statute. ....
In this case the question before the court was whether an attempt
to create a remainder in the testator's great-grandchildren violated the
rule against perpetuities and the court went on to say that it was
unnecessary to decide that the statute may not be applied to restraints
on alienation. The court also failed to state in this case that the
statute had also been applied to cases as a statute prohibiting the
suspension of the power of alienation. It is apparent that clarification
is needed. If the court adopted fixed, mechanical rules as to what
limitations and conditions are invalid under the statute, titles would
be more secure and the validity of the limitations could be determined
more often without a lawsuit. It may be that remedial legislation is
the only solution to the problem. The legislature could bring clarity
out of chaos by repealing KRS 381.220 and declaring the common law
rule against perpetuities in force in this state.
William C. Brafford, Jr.
45 297 S.W. 2d 905 (Ky. 1956).
46 Id. at 907-908.
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